This paper assesses Mikl6s R6dei's [1991] proof of the proposition that algebraic relativistic quantum field theory is stochastic Einstein local. The conclusion is that either R6dei's proof is spurious, in that it does not really prove what it intends to establish, or that the proof is fallacious. The paper is self-contained in the sense that the few ingredients of algebraic quantum theory that go into R6dei's proof are first summed up. Then Hellman's definition of stochastic Einstein locality is discussed, a detailed exposition is offered of R6dei's proof, and finally the author's refutation is explicated.
ALGEBRAIC RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM FIELD THEORY
These introductory remarks on algebraic relativistic quantum field theory (AQT) are based on Haag (1992) and Landsman (1991) .
In AQT one starts with the uniform closure allot.'= UcW(G) In the algebraic approach the probability of finding a value a when measuring local observable A(G)~d (G) in state ~k e~ equals the expectation value of local projection Pa(G)~d(G) in state ~, e~-:
Both ways of doing things yield the same number; the difference is that the piece of measurement apparatus associated with some physical magnitude, performing the measurement in space-time region G, is stipulated by ordinary quantum mechanics to measure the operator J and by the algebraic approach to measure the local observable A(G).
The second point concerns the implementation of the Poincar6 group in AQT (actually the covering group ~ in order to deal with spin--we gloss over this point). Poincar~ symmetry in AQT means that to each Poincar6 transformation g..= (A, b), where A denotes a Lorentz transformation and b a space-time translation, there corresponds an automorphism on the net Cr : d(G) ~ d(gG) edior The local algebra d(G) of region G is mapped to the local algebra dg(G) of the Poincar6 transformed region g(G) in such a way that all algebraic relations between the observables are conserved (form invariance) and that all scalar quantities, like expectation values (and thus probabilities), are invariant. The states and observables in AQT transform by ge~ as follows (the existence of inverse transformations is a group property): ~k ~ ~k' = ~O o ~g", and
It is easy to see that the expectation value of any observable A(G)~t (G) in any region G c ~r in any state ~ is invariant under any Poincar6 transformation g ~N:
Actually the transformations (2) of AQT follow from the Poincar6 invariance of scalar quantities applied to the expression for the expectation values as we just did. Applying (2) to P,~(G)~r yields for V~b s~-
One might wonder: where are the quantum fields? The transition from an algebra of local observables to a realistic field theory is notoriously difficult and one of the main areas of interest of AQT; connection between the two is established by (internal, dynamical) superselection rules and the concomitant symmetries. We shall not be needing the fields in this paper. To focus the mind through AQT glasses: think about any microphysical system at G, of which any physical magnitude is represented by an element A(G) of the local algebra ~r which can be measured by an A-apparatus at G.
STOCHASTIC EINSTEIN LOCALITY
Hellmann (1982a) aims to close the gap between the physical requirements of special relativity, especially the no-superluminal-action requirement, and the idea of "Bell-locality," which is the notion that (the probability of) measurement outcomes (are functions which) do not depend on whatever there is outside the light-cone of the measurement event. A theory is deterministic in magnitude A (zl,... , zn) , Zi~olr iff any two models of the theory that agree evaluated at all k-tuples y~ .... , Yk (Yi ~J/) for all k e ~ earlier z than an arbitrary n-tuple x~ .... , xn (x~ e~), also agree with regard to A(x~ .... , x,,). A theory is deterministic iff it is deterministic in all its magnitudes. Call the intersection of an infinite space-like hypersurface dividing Jg into two disjoint parts and the backward light-cone of any subset V c ~/ (which may contain only one point) a spacelike backward tight-cone slice of V, or for short a V-splice. A theory is deterministic Einstein local (DEL) in magnitude A(zl .... , z,,) iff any two models of the theory that agree evaluated at all k-tuples y~,..., Yk (Yi s~r for all k E N, on an arbitrary x~ .... , xn-splice, agree with regard to A(x~ .... , x,). 3 Hellman (1982a, p. 455) ) shows that every deterministic theory that obeys ~Hellman (1982a, p. 458 ) takes this definition relative to an inertial frame. SBackward light-cone LC-(x~ ..... x,) is then the union of the backward light-cones: U~LC-(x,). DEL implies a Bell inequality. And Hellman (1982a, p. 450) claims "that any genuine physical theory, deterministic in its physical magnitudes, will have to satisfy this model-theoretic condition [DEL] if it is to avoid commitment to action-at-a-distance". Indeed, if two models match in a backward light-cone but differ at the top of this light-cone, then the determining factor for this difference (the theory is deterministic) must lie outside the light-cone and hence propagates superluminally. Hellman (1982b) aims to formulate a condition analogous to DEL for stochastic theories, called stochastic Einstein locality (SEL) , and purports to show that SEL does not imply a Bell inequality and that quantum mechanics does not violate SEL. We shall not be concerned with the latter two points, only with the first one. Here is an: (zl ..... zn) , where zi are space-time points, iff any two models of the theory which agree evaluated on an arbitrary x~ ..... x,-splice, for an arbitrary k-tuple, also agree with regard to the probability of finding value a for magnitude A(xl ..... Xn), for all possible values of A(x~ ..... x,), but exclude from this probability all conditional probabilities of finding value a for A(Xl,..., Xn) that (i) can be derived from any joint probability which is locally determined by the theory (meaning: any two models of the theory which agree evaluated on a splice of the intersection of the backward light-cones of the events of this joint probability under consideration also agree with regard to this joint probability); and that (ii) that can be derived by using information outside the backward light-cone of xl ..... x, in order to assign a new state to the system under consideration at x~ .... , xn.
The provisos (i) and (ii) do not come into play in R6dei's proof, so a formal account of them will not be given--in contradistinction to the central part of SEL. But their idea is this (see Fig. 1 ). Hellman (1982b, p. 467) deems proviso (i) necessary to avoid that "virtually no theory with essentially stochastic elements could satisfy locality [SELl." An example that would turn orthodox quantum mechanics into an SEL-violating theory if proviso (i) were not included is Einstein's remark that if one particle leaves a decaying nucleus and is detected somewhere, then the probability of finding it somewhere else drops instantaneously to zero. But, as Hellman continues, "there is no basis for inferring that some energy or force has propagated faster than light." Hellman (1982b, p. 478) motivates proviso (ii) by the idea that in quantum mechanics it is "an unresolved issue how to understand reduction" of the state to an eigenstate (the projection postulate). One could add that there is no such thing as a physical interaction, as far as detectors can tell, between the spacelike separated particles in the Bell experiment when a measurement is performed on either one particle. Thus everything in orthodox quantum mechanics that prima facie may turn quantum mechanics into a nonlocal theory, in the sense of violating SEL, is explicitly excluded by means of these provisos. Small wonder that Hellman (1982b, p. 479) can prove that quantum mechanics without the projection postulate is a stochastic Einstein local theory. Tailor-made suits always fit. Hellman takes a theory T to be a consistent set of sentences (propositions) formulated in a formal language ~(T). In the formal definition of SEL we shall encounter quantification over relations and functions (both are logically speaking predicates), so the syntaxis of La(T) must be at least as rich as second-order predicate logic. For the semantics of ~(T) we shall choose from the set of all admissible bivalent valuations, which are mappings ~(T) ~ {T, F}. As usual T ~ S means: all admissible valuations that satisfy T (render T True), satisfy sentence S too. A theory T c .ga(T) is (by definition) closed under derivation (if T F S, then SET), where the notation of derivability (k) is defined, for example, by Gentzen's system of Natural Deduction (Van Dalen, 1983, p. 156) . Mod(T) abbreviates the proper class of all models of T (it is not a set, so we shall use E as an abbreviation of 'belongs to'). Sent(La(T)) is the set of sentences of ~(T).
An explication of what is meant here by 'a model of theory T' will not be given; we only need to know the soundness property: all derivable sentences from the theory are satisfied (rendered true) by all models: Remarks. The application of SEL to quantum mechanics is not so straightforward as Hellman claims--who takes for the magnitude A in the Bell experiment the observable spin of particle 1 along a [~a(1)] and for Zl = zA (n = 1), where zA ~' is the place-time of the spin measurement event--, because observables in quantum mechanics are not functions on space-time points, but operators on Hilbert space. So A(zA) should be understood in this case as: a measurement event of observable ,4 at zA ~J[, predicating space-time point za with value + 89 of the particle! Another point is that Hellman (1982a, p. 448) assumes that "T specifies a background ontology of Minkowski space-time: every model M of T contains a manifold ~' of 'events'." This is obviously not the case in quantum mechanics, though the above definition of SEL is straightforwardly applied to quantum mechanics by Hellman (1982b, part 4) . If one wants to add a space-time arena to quantum mechanics, for instance, to locate measurement-events, this arena has to be the space-time manifold of Newtonian physics, because the space-time symmetry group of quantum mechanics is not the Lorentz group, but the Galilei group. It is, however, not easy to understand why we should fear superluminal action in a space-time arena which lacks a light-cone structure. 
RI~DEI'S PROOF

M ~ Prob([A(G)]*~a) =p ~ M t ~ Prob(r~(G)]*ea) =p under provisos (i) and (ii).
Again, AQT is SEL iff it is SEL in all G c J[. This definition of SEL in the context of AQT is not identical to Rrdei's definition; we have added a few things for clarity. (a) Rrdei omits the state ~k e~. But it must be added, because the probability of an observable having a certain value depends on the state. (b) Rrdei takes the probabilities of finding the value of a local observable A(G) in an interval a ~ Sp(A(G)), for all subsets of the spectrum of the observable, whereas Hellman takes probabilities of finding exactly one value a of an observable, for all values in the spectrum of the observable (as we have done). So, formally Rrdei's definition accommodates observables with continuous spectra too. (c) The provisos are not mentioned by Rrdei; they should be, in order to prevent spurious violations of SEL.
Next we arrive at the central result:
Proposition. Algebraic Relativistic Quantum FieM Theory is a stochastic Einstein local theory.
Rrdei's Proof. The proof is a reductio ad absurdum argument. First a rough sketch, then the rigorous proof.
Assume AQT and not SEL, that is, assume the antecedent of SEL and the negation of the consequent. Now push the region G into its backward light-cone by an active space-time translation b~ [bG ~ LC-(G) ] and consider the local algebra on the shifted region [d(bG)] which is related to the local algebra on the original region G by an automorphism (~b) on the net (allot). Poincar6 symmetry requires that the probabilities on G concerning any observable of the local algebra [A(G)e~(G) ] are equal to the probabilities concerning the corresponding observable of the local algebra on the shifted region [A'(bG) 
So if a certain probability is different in two models, as follows from the negation of the consequent of SEL, it remains different after applying a Poincar6 transformation to the situation. By mathematical manipulation this probability is construed as a real scalar function on the shifted region (hb: J// bG ~ [0, 1] c R), which consequently means that one function ascribes different values to the shifted region in the two models. But by supposition of SEL's antecedent all corresponding functions of the two models ascribe identical values to identical regions in the backward light-cone of G. Contradiction. Now the rigor. Assume that AQT violates SEL. Then the antecedent of SEL is true by assumption. Any space-time translation is a Poincar6 transformation: b e~. Let b~eR 4 be a timelike vector pointing backward; choose IIb ll sufficiently '.,,ge such that it shifts G into its own backward light-cone: bG c-LC-(G). The second conjunct of SEL's antecedent cer-tainly holds for the special case G1 = bG (k = 1). VM, M% Mod(AQT), Vf ~ Pred(2):
Now we turn to SEL's consequent . Either 3a~Sp(A(G) ), 3~k E~, such that the following is false:
or one of the provisos is false. Since the provisos are completely ignored by Rfdei, we shall interpret him as assuming, for reductio, that a genuine violation of SEL occurs. In other words, we interpret Rfdei charitably, so that only spurious violations are not accounted for by his proof. The negation of SELs consequent is then true, which yields
Using (1), we obtain for this reductio assumption (6)
The state ~ e~ is a linear functional which maps observable Pa(G) to a number in the interval [0, 1] c ~.
Since the space-time symmetries ~ of AQT form a group, ~b has an inverse automorphism ~nv ; we obtain from (3) with g = b and applying the functional r = r
The right-hand side of (8) defines a mapping h b from bG c ~/to [0, 1] = [the left-hand side of (8) is a probability due to (1); so hb is a real scalar function on a region of the manifold]:
Substituting in (7) yields
Since (5) holds VfePred(2), we are allowed to choose the special case f =hb:
Whether p = r or p ~ r, on both accounts (10) contradicts (11). To avoid this absurdity, it must be assumed that AQT does not violate SEL. QED Rfdei's proof is far more compact, which made it not that easy to see where it goes wrong; the more detailed exposition above will enable us to point out where and to understand why the proof is either spurious or fallacious.
REFUTATION OF Ri~DEI'S PROOF
To start with, we remark that the proof effectively uses only the symmetry of the group of space-time translations--which constitutes together with the Lorentz group the Poincar6 group ~--so the proof holds, too, for an algebraic field theory having the Galilei group as its space-time symmetry group. But surely a nonrelativistic field theory need not obey SEL.
Furthermore, Poincar6 symmetry by itself does not exclude tachyon fields; they can be introduced without destroying the Poincar6 symmetry. With tachyon fields it is easy to think of a model that violates SEL by triggering a tachyon source in a region Gtach c ~// at spacelike distance from the region G c ~; then the probabilities at G will definitely be influenced by Gt~ch; hence a violation of SEL. Tachyon fields are excluded, however, by an axiom of AQT stating that all energies are positive (Haag, 1992, p. 106) . But this axiom is nowhere used in the proof.
Another crucial ingredient one expects to appear in the proof is AQTs axiom of local commutativity, which states that the algebras of spacelike separated regions commute (Haag, 1992, p. 107) . But it is absent from the proof too.
With the above-mentioned axioms of AQT it may well be possible to prove that AQT obeys SEL, but the considerations above already strongly indicate that this cannot be established by R6dei's proof. First we shall detect a logical oversight in the proof, which renders the proof vacuous.
The assumption that SELs consequent is false, in that the probability of an observable A(G) having value a in state r is different in two models, generates no problem. But setting these probabilities equal to the expectation value of the local observable Pa(G)~(G), as stipulated by AQT (1), generates a major problem, because AQT defines the state ~,~" as the functional which maps Pa(G) to its one and only expectation value.
Assume it equals pc[0, 1]:
"r = p"~AQT Then due to (7) clearly M' is not a model of AQT, for M" renders this statement false. If we assume that this expectation value does not equal p, but p'( # p), such that M' does not turn out to be a model of AQT, then M is not a model of AQT, again due to (7). So statement (7) is inconsistent with the assumption that both M and M' are models of AQT. Having hardly asserted the reductio assumption (7), one can immediately conclude that it contradicts AQT, given the soundness property (4) of the models. So the detour with the space-time translation b e~, which is the actual content of the proof, is superfluous.
Furthermore, even SELs antecedent has not been used! So this 'proof' goes through if we replace SELs antecedent by: any two models that disagree in all their functions and relations in the backward light-cone of G c ~. Then Rrdei's proof justifies the following proposition, too: if two models of AQT that disagree in all their functions and relations in the backward light-cone of G c d,/, then they agree with regard to all the expectation values of all local observables of ~r at G. Quite a miracle! The conclusion is that this is an empty proof. The only aspect of AQT it effectively uses is that AQT defines the state by means of an expectation value. Every aspect of AQT that smells of locality (the Lorentz group, the so-called diamond property, local commutativity, which are explicitly added to AQT to meet the exigencies of special relativity) is ignored in Rrdei's proof.
Is The illegitimate choice f= hb just before statement (11) is the culprit, as well as the tacit identification b(G) = bG. Therefore (5) does not entail (11) and the desired contradiction between statements (5) and (10) simply does not follow. To conclude, by choosing different states in order to avoid a spurious proof, the reasoning turns out to be fallacious. We close with the remark that in a more encompassing treatment of SEL in the context of AQT, which contains a correct proof of the central Proposition of the present paper, the latter fallacy of Rrdei's proof will be treated in formal detail. See Muller and Butterfield (1994) .
